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ABSTRACT
Th is paper examines the 
contribution made by the scientific 
management movement to the 
stabilisation of production and 
employment in the United States in 
the years 1914-1930. By focusing 
on the debates in the official journal 
of the Taylor Society, the paper is 
able to sketch the manner by which 
the ideas of the Taylorists evolved 
throughout this period. Beginning 
by concen tra tin g  on the 
deve lopm en t o f stabilisation 
practices at the workshop level, it 
is shown that the scientific 
managers came to focus, in time, on 
the whole firm and eventually 
became convinced that an effective 
stabilisation strategy must embrace 
all levels o f the economic 
environment.
Perhaps no better way exists .... of understanding the progress 
and diffusion of the [scientific management] movement than in 
tracing it through the files of the Bulletin of the Taylor Society, 
which has been hospitable to suggestions, from every source, for 
increased efficiency and which has recorded the chief successes 
and failures of the great variety of experiments in recent years 
(Rexford Tugwell 1927,122).
In the labour economics literature, the notion of scientific 
management is associated with the American theorist 
Frederick Winslow Taylor and is primarily perceived as being 
an anti-worker, labour control strategy. The prevalence of this 
perspective, makes it difficult for analysts to comprehend why 
it was that the trade unions in the United States collaborated 
with the leaders of the scientific management movement 
through the inter-war years. It is our contention this 
development can be understood only if one is aware of the 
extent to which the Taylorists concerned themselves with 
issues such as the reduction of working hours and the 
democratisation of public institutions. Recent studies of the 
scientific managers' involvement in the above areas have 
been undertaken respectively by Nyland (1989) and Schachter 
(1989). These revisionist historians have sought to highlight 
the fact that labour control was far from being the scientific 
managers' only area of interest. In this article we seek to add to 
this literature by outlining the theoretical and practical 
contribution made by the Taylorists to the stabilisation of the 
business cycle and hence to the creation of employment 
security.
Taking up Tugwell's suggestion, the major vehicle we 
utilise to examine the scientific managers' contribution to
market stabilisation is The Bulletin o f the Taylor Society  
(BTS). This journal, begun in 1914, was the official publication 
of The Taylor Society. The latter body was an organisation 
whose primary purpose was the promotion and development 
of the ideas of those individuals who worked with or who 
were inspired by Taylor. We have chosen to use the Society's 
journal as our instrument of investigation in order to reduce 
the danger that we will misrepresent the character of scientific 
management or be guilty of the myopia which distinguishes 
those analysts whom H.S. Person (1929, 5), the Managing 
Director of the Society through the 1920s, described as the 
"superficially informed". By this he meant those who believe 
that the "systematic planning and directing of work" 
constituted the whole of the Taylor system.
SHOP AND WAR PLANNING
Central to the scientific m anagers' approach to the 
stabilisation of the business cycle was their belief in the value 
of the scientific method of investigation. The Taylorists were 
convinced that rule of thumb and tradition were not 
acceptable bases for guiding the production and distribution of 
wealth. Indeed, Taylor insisted that the rigorous application of 
the scientific method to the problem of management was 
fundamental to the scientific managers methodology.
Scientific management cannot be said to exist .... in any 
establishment until after [a] .... change has taken place in the 
mental attitude of both the management and the men, both as to 
their duty to cooperate in producing the largest possible surplus 
and as to the necessity for substituting exact scientific knowledge 
for opinions or the old rule of thumb or individual knowledge. 
These are the two absolutely essential elements of scientific
management. (Taylor 1911, 1389)
In relation to the second element Person observed a decade 
later that scientific management contained two fundamental 
ideas.
The first is that management should analyze every phase or 
element of the business so far as possible in accordance with the 
scientific method—the method which by research, 
investigation, experiment or otherwise secures all available 
data concerning each phase or element of the business—physical, 
physiological or psychological—and derives therefrom 
relatively stable and dependable facts on which to base plans 
and procedures .... The second fundamental idea is that, those 
dependable facts once ascertained, plans for operation and 
operating controls shall be developed which are relatively 
precise in their intentions and expectations of results, because 
based upon a knowledge of conditions resulting from the 
preceding scientific analyses (Person 1921, 50).
W riting in 1929, Person observed that the issues the 
scientific managers focused upon tended to change over time. 
This tendency could be perceived in the work of Taylor and it 
was a process that continued after the latter's death. At the 
same time Person insisted that this constant modification of 
the ideas, areas of concern and techniques of scientific 
management in no way constituted an abandonment of 
Taylor's principles (1929,10).
In both Taylor's own writings and in the work of Taylorists 
published prior to the United States' entry into the First 
World War, the advocates of scientific management primarily 
confined themselves to workshop problems wherein they 
applied their techniques to the determination of how and 
when production was to be undertaken. However, it should
be noted that at no stage was scientific management 
considered to be merely a labour control device or simply a 
philosophy designed to legitimate bureaucratic management 
systems.
As Taylor himself insisted, scientific management was more than 
just a program for time study or an incentive wage system; rather, 
it was a comprehensive plan, composed of a number of 
interrelated innovations that promised to improve the overall 
productive efficiency of the enterprise. The first step in the ideal 
scientific management program was always the improvement 
and standardization of tools and equipment and the improvement 
of various aspects of shop organization. The latter process could 
include the development of a better storage system, the 
installation of more comprehensive cost accounting procedures, 
and the establishment of a system for routine maintenance and 
repair (Meiksins 1984, 180).
It should also be noted that while Taylor confined the 
application of his ideas primarily to the workshop he never 
believed they were only applicable in this arena. He 
concentrated on the shop because he was convinced this was 
where he could make his greatest contribution but he urged 
others to seek to apply the scientific method to the 
management of all areas of productive activity.
That the pre-war Taylorists had concerns that were broader 
than the workshop is manifest in the fact that as early as 1908 
there are indications of concern in the work of some of these 
individuals of the fact that productive efficiency tends to be 
undermined by the volatility of the capitalist business cycle. 
Prior to the founding of the BTS  individual em ployer 
mem bers of the scien tific  m anagem ent m ovem ent 
experimented with a range of measures designed to stabilise 
the demand for their products and the employment security
of their employees. Of the latter individuals the most 
influential and innovative was Henry Dennison an employer 
who later served a term as President of the Taylor Society and 
who was subsequently described by J.K. Galbraith (1981, 61) as 
"arguably, the most interesting businessman in the United 
States".
Metcalf has observed that after the depression of 1908 
Dennison "introduced practically the whole gamut of 
m easures promoted to 'regularize' business operations" 
(Metcalf 1975, 63).
First, the company modified the time pattern of its demand by 
reorganizing its sales department to make it more responsive to 
efforts to reduce the costs of instability, by applying sales effort 
to secure orders further in advance and increase business during 
slack periods, and by diversifying into new markets to spread 
demand. Second, it made production rates more stable than orders 
and shipments by systematically producing to inventory during 
slack periods. Employment was made more stable than 
production by a policy of training workers for transfer between 
departments. A third measure, begun after the 1914 depression, 
involved counter-cyclical planning of plant construction. Finally, 
the company secured its outstanding reputation in the field of 
employment stabilization by establishing, in 1916, the first 
company unemployment compensation fund in the country 
(Metcalf 1975, 63).
Galbraith reports that Dennison's adoption of these 
stabilisation techniques was resented by other employers who 
organised a boycott of his firm on the grounds that he was 
"spoiling the working classes" (Galbraith 1981, 62). This 
contrasts with the warm reception of his ideas within the 
Taylor Society whose members perceived the downturns in 
economic activity that periodically characterised the business
cycle as both a disaster for employers and employees and as 
enormously wasteful of resources. The Taylorists' perspective 
regarding the waste induced by the business cycle is 
encapsulated in a 1923 observation by N.I. Stone in the BTS.
The recurrence of business cycles is one of the worst, if not the 
worst, disturbers of managerial plans for the orderly and 
economic operation of industrial plants. Efficient plant operation 
above all requires regularity in the repetitive processes of 
industry. This regularity is widely upset by the intrusion of 
outside economic forces having nothing to do with internal plant 
management and over which the plant engineer has no control. 
Plant organizations, including specialists of high degree, skilled 
mechanics trained and disciplined through years of hard work in 
the special processes developed in the particular plant, plant 
morale built up through the laborious effort of the employment 
manager, an esprit de corps, developed among the staff of 
executives and foremen, are all swept away almost over night 
through the necessity of shutting down the plant dictated by the 
sudden cessation of orders and the drying up of bank credit .... 
When plant operations are resumed after the storm is over, most 
of the work of the plant managers must be done over again with a 
newly rebuilt organization. Even the work of unskilled labor 
suffers under the circumstances, for there is hardly any labor, no 
matter how low the degree of skill, that does not gain in 
efficiency through acquaintance with and adaptation to the 
conditions of each plant, and it therefore takes time to "tune up" 
a plant to a performance somewhere near 100 per cent of its 
capacity (Stone 1923, 93).
Dennison's stabilisation techniques were applauded in the 
BTS in 1915 in a paper by R.G. Valentine titled 'Scientific 
Management and Organised Labor'. In this article Valentine 
called upon the members of the scientific management
movement to emulate Dennison's policies and to strive to 
plan production in a manner that would dampen the 
fluctuations caused by both seasonality and by the business 
cycle.
[Y]ou should plan as far as you possibly could for regularity of 
employment; first by regulating your own business to the greatest 
extent possible, and secondly, .... you should establish and have 
some idea of co-operative relationship with other concerns in 
other lines of industry, so that when your slack period came, 
when yours came against his full period, your could make some 
shift to the advantage of each, and thirdly, as business men 
looking after your own interests .... you [should] take some kind of 
interest in state public work, so the state would not be going into 
the market when wages were high and business good, but instead 
when condition of unemployment bad (Valentine 1915,5-6).
The volume of the BTS published in 1916 was even more 
propitious both as regards the notion of market stabilisation. 
In an article titled 'The Progressive Relation Between 
Efficiency And Consent', Valentine (1916: 11-13) argued that 
the Society needed to widen its focus from particular plants to 
the entire field of industry. He called for the establishment of 
a planning department within the Society which would 
investigate not only the best way to organise production and 
distribution but which would also study the social, industrial 
and moral effects of various forms of production. However, 
for our purposes the most significant paper of this volume 
was presented by H.S. Person. The latter, aware the 
fluctuations that characterised the business cycle were a major 
cause of waste and inefficiency and that the slumps associated 
with these cycles had a disastrous effect on the lives of 
workers and the profits of firms, observed that the systematic 
planning of production had much to offer those who would
provide workers with greater job security.
I think I see in it [the notion of planning] the opportunity for 
regularizing employment .... I do not see any possibility of 
regularization without precise knowledge of facts, ability to 
predict, and precise control; and one plant—a Scientific 
Management plant—has had the nerve to tackle the problem of 
regularizing employment by deliberately not making all it can in 
full season and holding production over to the dull season (Person 
1916, 21).
When the United States entered the First World War, most 
of the leading Taylorists took employment with government 
agencies such as the War Industries Board (Haber 1964, 118- 
120). This latter body has been described by Schlesinger (1957: 
40) as "the central experiment in economic planning" of the 
war period. Through the Board, the Federal Government 
directed industrial production, selecting industries and 
products which were considered essential and giving them 
preference in the use of materials, labour, capital, and 
transportation. Unlike the planning adopted subsequently in 
the Soviet Union the American planners did not seek to 
substitute state ownership of the means of production for 
private enterprise. This point has been stressed by Soule (1967) 
in his history of American economic planning in order to 
make the point that planning even when undertaken at a 
national level does not necessarily mean the abolition of 
market forces, or the outlawing of private property or the 
profit motive.
Rather, it means influencing existing economic habits and outlook 
by a program which serves needs not contemplated by, and not 
normally fulfilled by, the existing order. National planning 
looks at wider horizons or longer futures than do the daily
decisions of the managers of individual firms or industries. And 
its goals, if sanctioned by the citizens, make use of foresights and 
capabilities developed by the "organizing man", in the domain 
of a whole society (Soule 1967,16).
HERBERT HOOVER AND W ASTE
The Taylorists' experience with war planning had a dramatic 
effect on the thinking of the leaders of the scientific 
management movement. They were tremendously impressed 
at the extent to which the government's program of managed 
mobilisation expanded industrial output. Through the war, as 
John Maurice Clark (1931, 170) a frequent visitor to Taylor 
Society meetings has noted, American industry proved 
capable of producing at a capacity that had previously been 
held to be unattainable. With the end of the conflict most 
observers argued the war experience offered no insights for 
the conduct of business in peacetime. The members of the 
Taylor Society, on the other hand, tended to believe that the 
war had vindicated their belief that conscious, systematic 
intervention in the production process had the potential to 
expand dramatically the wealth of society (Person 1919,10-14).
H.S. Person observed in 1927 that the war experience 
changed the scientific management movement from a force 
concerned with the "stabilization of shop processes" to one 
whose focus was the "stabilization of all the processes of the 
enterprise" (Person 1927, 391). This transform ation is 
exemplified in the post-war ideas and practices of Herbert 
H oover, the most prom inent advocate of scientific 
management through the 1920s. In his respective positions as 
President of the Federated American Engineering Societies, 
Secretary of Commerce and President of the United States, 
Hoover played a critical role in furthering the transformation
of scientific management from an enterprise concern to an 
industry and eventually a national affair. Though an 
enthusiastic supporter of capitalism, Hoover accepted that the 
market did not always allocate resources in the most efficient 
manner. He therefore supported the use of the visible hand of 
planning at both the micro and macro level and thought 
himself to be a "scientific manager of the economy" (Barber 
1985,99).
W here classical econom ists m ooted unrestrained 
competition between independent economic units as the best 
means of ensuring prosperity, Hoover envisaged active 
cooperation between business and government (Wilson 1975, 
68). However, he was not a "statist" He had a deep ideological 
commitment to the notion that private and local public 
institutions, had to accept responsibility for solving social 
problems. Consequently, he rejected both federal government 
direction of economic activity and the enforcem ent on 
individual firms of the policies of those trade organisations 
that claimed to represent the collective interests of business. 
While he believed in the need for "national planning of 
industry and comm erce" he meant by this only that 
decentralised corporate planning should take place within the 
context of a larger perspective than the individual business 
and this especially so as regards such issues as the 
standardisation of parts and equipment. The state itself was 
not to directly plan and direct industry. Rather its role was to 
assist firms to plan effectively by accum ulating and 
disseminating knowledge of existing trends within the 
economy. Hoover believed the "associative state" he 
envisaged would provide a "middle way .... between laissez- 
faire, antistatist economic formula that would ruthlessly 
'liquidate' wages and jobs and statist proposals that would 
expand bureaucratic controls destructive to Am erican
enterprise" (Murphy 1988, 10 - 11). In the early 1920s he 
maintained that: "If we could secure this cooperation .... we 
should have provided a new economic system, based neither 
on the capitalism of Adam Smith nor upon the socialism of 
Karl Marx" (cited in Layton 1971: 192).
In November 1920 Hoover was elected President of the 
Federated American Engineering Societies. His election was 
largely a consequence of the fact that 'progressives' within the 
professional engineering associations were demanding that 
their societies play a larger role in the social life of the nation. 
Metcalf (1975,64) reports these progressives came largely from 
that sector of the engineering profession who considered 
themselves the "heirs of Frederick Taylor". The influence of 
this faction was reflected in the fact that immediately 
following Hoover's election the executive of the Federation 
approved a proposal for "an investigation of Industrial 
W astes" and appointed Taylor Society members to the 
majority of the positions on the Committee charged with 
conducting the study (Layton 1971,194).
The Committee on the Elimination of Waste in Industry 
began its work early in 1921, some fifty engineers gathered 
information on two hundred and twenty-eight plants in six 
major industries. The Committee used a common- sense 
approach to define industrial efficiency expressing waste as the 
difference between the average efficiency of the enterprises 
sampled in each industry and the most efficient plant in the 
same class (Mitchell 1922; Knoeppel 1922). What Hoover 
hoped to achieve in the waste survey he made clear in a paper 
he published in the BTS (Hoover 1921). He stated that the 
study would attempt to visualise the nation as a single 
industrial organism  and identify the primary factors 
obstructing the maximisation of production. He believed the 
major causes of industrial waste were the inefficient use of
labour, poor coordination between industries and lack of 
standardisation. The greatest single factor obstructing output 
maximisation he maintained were the "large periods of slack 
production and unemployment" that occurred as a result of 
the "ebb and flow of economic tides between booms and 
slumps" (Hoover 1921, 78).
Hoover's solution for the instability caused by the business 
cycle was the "coordination of great industries" by the 
provision of appropriate knowledge. He accepted the validity 
of Say's Law that supply creates its own demand but accepted 
that overproduction could occur as a result of industries 
producing the wrong goods because they lacked adequate 
information.
There is no such thing as the nation over-production, if it 
produces the right commodities. The commodities or services 
produced by the whole nation are capable of absorption by the 
whole nation if they are of the right character. In other words, if 
we could attune the whole industrial machine to the highest 
pitch .... an increasing production would mean a directly 
increasing standard of living (Hoover 1921, 77-78).
Hoover accepted it was not possible to attain the "ideal" of a 
constant steady increase in production because of society's 
"inability to ever gauge the advance on growth consumption 
or the approach of saturation". However, he believed that if 
private and public enterprises were provided with more 
"timely, more regular, and more complete information of the 
current production and consumption and stocks of the great 
commodities in the United States" it would be possible to 
"clip the top of booms and the depression from slum ps" 
(Hoover 1923, vi-vii).
The Waste Committee concluded that the primary source 
of inefficiency within the USA was the poor quality of its
m anagem ent. It also endorsed H oover's belief that 
management's inability to stabilise the business cycle was the 
single greatest source of inefficiency. Consequently, the 
Committee argued that it was critical that there be developed 
means for reducing the volatility of market fluctuations. At 
the level of the enterprise it advocated the closer correlation 
of production schedules with sales policies and the balancing 
of productive capacity (Committee on Waste in Industry 1921, 
25). It also recommended the development of programs that 
would lessen the seasonal character of production in such 
industries as construction and coal mining, the establishment 
of trade associations which would collect information on 
output and stock levels and the planning of investment so 
that this form of spending would act as a stimulant in times of 
recession. Of the last issue the Committee observed:
Studies of industries as a whole show that we usually expand our 
equipment as the periods of maximum demand for products 
instead of doing our plant expansion during periods of slack 
consumption. While it cannot be expected that all industry could 
be so stabilized as to do its capital construction in slack periods, 
there are some industries which could be led in this direction by 
co-operation with the government and co-operation among 
themselves. This applies particularly to railways, telephones, 
telegraphs, power concerns and other public utilities, and to 
expenditure upon our municipal, state and national public works 
(Committee on Waste in Industry 1921,32-33).
The breadth of the Waste Committee's report justifies 
M etcalf's claim that the study was a landmark in the 
transition of scientific management from what Hoover 
characterised as its pre-war devotion "to the minutiae of shop 
and office routine [to] broad questions of policy-making" (cited 
by Metcalf 1975, 64). Within the Taylor society the report was
warmly though critically received. This response reflected not 
only the composition of the Waste Committee but also the 
fact that as Drury observed in 1922:
[T]he leaders in scientific management have lately come to feel 
that the highest efficiency in industry and, indeed, all 
industries are studied and improved as one whole. The movement 
in this direction has been led by Herbert Hoover, first as 
president of the Federated American Engineering Societies, and 
more recently as Secretary of Commerce (Drury 1922,9).
That the Taylorists considered the report to be the product of 
their efforts was made clear by Person in a 1923 BTS paper 
titled 'On The Contribution Of Scientific Management To 
Industrial Problems'. In this article Person observed that the 
work of the Committee on the Elimination of Waste was 
Taylorism in its purest form. The Committee "was composed 
largely of Taylor engineers, its point of view was entirely 
Taylor, and the standards by which it judged waste were the 
standards .... of scientific management" (Person 1923, 118).
H oover's promotion of the scientific m anagem ent 
movement continued after he was appointed Secretary of 
Commerce. He employed E.E. Hunt of the Taylor Society as 
his personnel assistant and together they reorganised the 
Department. In this reorganisation the Division of Building 
and Housing was developed in order to eliminate wastes in 
the building industry by developing uniform municipal 
building codes, by reorganising the financing of the industry 
and by studying city and town zoning (Hunt 1924, xiii). A 
central place was also accorded a newly created Division of 
Simplified Practice which Barber reports was staffed by "a 
stream of talents flowing from Frederick Taylor's campaigns 
for scientific management" (Barber 1985, 13). The latter 
Division, as Hunt observed in his 1924 volume S cien tific
Management Since Taylor, was organised as a national agency 
"through which the elimination of wasteful types and 
varieties of products, processes and methods can be brought 
about as a result of voluntary agreement by groups of 
producers, distributors and users" (Hunt 1924, xiii). The 
consequent savings of this latter division alone were 
estimated to be $600 million per annum which, as Barber 
(1985, 13) has noted, was no trivial sum in an economy in 
which value added by the manufacturing sector was $18 
billion.
In the midst of the deep economic slump of 1920-1922 
Hoover also had Hunt organise the first national 
unem ployment conference ever convened by a federal 
government department—the President's Conference on 
Unemployment. The latter act led to the creation of a 
permanent committee which under the guidance of Hunt 
published or actively collaborated with the American 
Engineering Council in the preparation of a number of major 
studies directly related to the stabilisation of the business cycle 
through the first half of the 1920s. These reports included, 
Business Cycles and Unemployment (1922-1923), Coal Storage 
(1923-1924) and Seasonal Operation in the Construction  
Industries (1923-1924).
The stabilisation reports advocated a number of devices for 
reducing both the volatility of the business cycle and 
unemployment. These included the use of public works 
spending as a countercyclical device and the establishment of 
public employment exchanges. However, what distinguishes 
the reports was the degree of emphasis placed on the extent to 
which improving the management of individual enterprises 
could enhance stabilisation. This perspective reflected the 
focus of those scientific managers concerned with the issue of 
unemployment in the early 1920s. Their perspective was well
captured in the following statement by Morris Cooke in a 
paper on unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent he 
published in the BTS in 1921. "The maximum relief from the 
evils attendant upon unemployment will come about 
through a localization of the problem within the individual 
manufacturing plants" (Cooke, 1921, 163). The Taylorists did 
not believe the scientific manager, operating solely within the 
enterprise, could solve the unemployment problem per se. As 
Person observed, in an address to the American Association of 
Public Employment Officers in 1920, the scientific manager's 
focus was the "immediate operating policies and methods" of 
the enterprise. Much of the root cause of unemployment, on 
the other hand, was centred at that level of business activity 
that was speculative and\or was concerned with the "far- 
reaching, governing activities" of enterprises. Even so, Person 
insisted, scientific management could contribute greatly to the 
minimisation of the unemployment problem by enhancing 
the operating methods of the firm.
Most enterprises operate under competitive conditions in markets 
in which the demand fluctuates. Business has not learned how to 
free itself from those alternating conditions known as buyers' and 
sellers' markets; not have many enterprises learned how to free 
themselves from the seasonal demands which characterise the 
disposition of their output. Under such circumstances the taking 
on of workers in one year and the discharge of workers in another 
year, or the taking on of workers in one season and their 
discharge in another, is to some degree inevitable; and only the 
most scientific of managements is able to reduce these variations 
in employment to a minimum. The competitive enterprise which 
succeeds in reducing these variations to a minimum is the 
enterprise which works out a balanced production of the various 
products according to seasonal demand; which establishes a
schedule which coordinates the financing, producing and selling 
of these products; which has such organization and methods of 
planning and operating control in its several departments as to 
maintain the schedule of coordinated financing, production and 
selling; which as a result of exhaustive investigation and 
analysis has such command of the elements entering into its 
operations as to make possible the coordinations, schedules and 
controls I am enumerating .... In the degree to which an enterprise 
has such management may it hope to achieve continuity of 
employment. That kind of management is scientific management 
(Person 1921,51).
In 1922 the scientific managers' perspective regarding the 
contribution of the firm to market stabilisation was further 
clarified in the BTS by H. Feldman, research secretary for the 
Econom ic A dvisory Com m ittee of the President's 
Unemployment Conference. In an aptly titled paper, 'The 
New Emphasis in the Problem of Reducing Unemployment', 
Feldman lauded William Beveridge and Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb for highlighting the fact that unemployment "is not 
due to overpopulation, immigration, changes in the gold 
supply and other disturbing factors, but to cyclical fluctuation, 
seasonal irregularity and other maladjustments of the 
industrial system" (Feldman 1922, 177). While applauding his 
British counterparts Feldman observed that he believed the 
contribution of these individuals was flawed by a failure to 
appreciate the part that can be played by the individual firm.
[A]n important cause of unemployment might be in the slipshod, 
careless and planless management prevalent in various firms .... 
that some employers, at least, could cut down the irregularity of 
their businesses by improvements in the technique of business 
administration (Feldman 1922, 176).
Noting that firms whose heads were members of the Taylor 
Society had been particularly prominent in the development 
of enterprise stabilisation he reported that the President's 
Committee on Unemployment was seeking to encourage 
American industry as a whole to adopt similar strategies. Like 
Person he acknowledged that enterprise stabilisation alone 
would not solve the unemployment problem but also 
insisted:
When efficient management has done all that should be 
expected of it, the disease of unemployment will be so moderated 
that a complete cure through the aid of the other and less 
important remedies discussed should not be difficult (Feldman 
1922,182; see also Feiss 1921).
THE 'SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION'
The Taylorists' emphasis on microeconomic reform in the 
first half of the 1920s was reflected in the BTS. Through this 
period the articles published that were directly relevant to the 
problem of stabilisation tended to emphasise the individual 
firm. However, one key aspect of economic stabilisation the 
contributors to the journal did believe needed to be handled at 
a macro level was the management of the nation's money 
supply. In 1921 Irving Fisher presented a paper to the Taylor 
Society in which he argued that the stabilisation of the 
economy and the full development of efficient production 
were simply not possible without a stable currency. Fisher was 
a pioneer in the development of index numbers which were 
capable of showing the average change in prices over time. He 
had a deep respect for Frederick Taylor and believed that his 
own character, ideals and methods of work were identical 
with those of Taylor (Fisher 1956, 215). The development of
effective means of measuring price changes, Fisher also 
believed, had provided the basic instruments required for the 
"scientific management of the money supply". Fisher's paper, 
'How an Unstabilized Dollar Interferes with Efficient 
Management', argued that falling prices tend to have a 
dampening effect on the economy. He also observed that if 
prices changed it often took consumers and investors an 
extended period before they adjusted their spending patterns 
accordingly. The deleterious effect this rigidity had on 
economic behaviour, he observed, could be overcome with 
the use of index numbers. Using these numbers the Federal 
Reserve Bank could manipulate the money supply in a 
manner which would adjust the amount of money in the 
economy in accordance with changes in prices and so stabilise 
the purchasing power of the dollar. Only if the currency was 
stabilised, Fisher insisted, would it be possible to contain the 
volatility of the business cycle.
Fisher's claim that the Federal Reserve should manage the 
money supply so as to ensure price and hence market 
stabilisation was welcomed by the Taylor Society. Likewise, 
the Society gave the approval of publication to a paper 
presented at its next meeting by Carl Snyder of the Federal 
Reserve. Snyder's paper, 'Barometers of Production', argued 
that m arket stabilisation required that the Federal 
Government not only develop a stabilised system of currency 
but that it also stabilise credit and establish a means for 
providing accurate and detailed data that would enable 
business to understand what was happening within the 
economy (Snyder 1921,186-187).
While the Taylorists in the early 1920s approved of Fisher's 
ideas, even at this stage some individuals saw the dire 
possibilities inherent in his analysis. The first indication of 
this concern in the BTS was a paper by Person titled 'Shaping
Your Management To Meet Changing Industrial Conditions'. 
Person, whom it should be noted had a PhD in economics, 
presented his paper to the Society in November 1922. This was 
a time when the economy of the USA was emerging from the 
post-war depression and entering the period of rapid 
industrial growth that was to characterise most of the rest of 
the decade. In his article, Person warned that there was a new 
predicament looming for American industry. This problem 
centred on the relationship between prices, demand and the 
productive capacity of industry.
During the past decade, as a result of the study of earlier cyclic 
movements, we have learned that certain economic phenomena, 
such as the quantity of money and credit, have a definite 
relation to industrial activity. The store of money and credit 
influences prices and the price movement influences industrial 
activity. We should recall that the long period of accelerating 
industrial activity culminating in the frenzy of 1920-21 was 
coincident with a long upward swing in prices; that in general 
industrial activity increases in intensity with an upward price 
movement, is stagnant when there is a downward price 
movement, and is hesitant and uncertain in the early years of a 
new stable price level. Of course, the ideal condition is a fairly 
stable general price level, but when a condition of stable price 
level suddenly confronts an industrial generation which has 
become accustomed to a consistent upward price movement over a 
long period, the new condition of stability, because different from 
the accustomed, is upsetting to the individual, either as 
demander or producer, and it takes a considerable period, 
measured not in months but in years, for him to learn just what he 
can safely do both in purchasing and in producing (Person 1922, 
212).
Why the effect of price changes so concerned Person was
because the Harvard Committee on Economic Research had 
recently forecast that over the next decade prices were likely to 
remain at a new high level. He doubted the validity of this 
assessment because he felt the Harvard Committee had "failed 
to take into consideration the capacity of American 
managerial genius to vastly increase, when put to it under 
intensely competitive conditions, the quantity of goods for 
exchange which may be produced from a given combination 
of plant, equipment, materials and labor" (Person 1922, 213). 
However, even if the Committee's forecast was correct it 
suggested that for some time into the future both producers 
and consumers were likely to be unsure of the new relation 
between their incomes and the cost of living. The conclusion 
he urged the members of the Taylor Society to draw from 
these observations was that for the next decade consumers' 
demand was likely to remain hesitant and uncertain. Given 
the nation's newly developed capacity to produce, a capacity 
which Person correctly predicted was likely to be enhanced 
through the 1920s, this would mean demand was likely to be 
out of proportion to the supply of goods. Having made these 
observations Person advised his listeners that these 
developments confronted American management with a 
fundamental problem.
The essential practical elements of the problem .... may be 
summed up as follows: On the side of supply there is a 
tremendous production capacity involving heavy investments of 
capital in more or less specialized equipment, to preserve the 
value of which will require a continuation of the lines of activity 
for which it was designed. On the other side of demand there is a 
conservative and hesitant market—in fact a buyers' market— 
which will continue for a considerable period (Person 1922, 214).
Person insisted that he was confident that American
management could resolve the demand problem. However, 
to achieve this objective it was imperative that the managers 
of enterprises give much greater attention to the social 
sciences in order that they might better comprehend the 
nature of an economy characterised by a buyers market. They 
needed also to accord much greater attention to the problems 
associated with marketing. It was no longer adequate to 
concentrate merely on developing the scientific management 
of production. In an economic environment in which 
demand could not be assumed to be readily forthcoming it 
was imperative that an equal degree of attention be applied to 
the management of markets.
Person's concern with the issue of demand management 
was reflected in the BTS. Through the middle years of the 
decade numerous papers appeared in the journal advising 
managers on how they could improve their marketing and 
coordinate sales and production. There was also a laudation of 
the productive benefits of high wages and an increase in the 
number of articles on the positive role that trade unions could 
play in ensuring workers received a share of the rewards of 
enhanced production commensurate with their input. 
Person's suggestion that the scientific  m anagem ent 
movement needed to pay much greater attention to the study 
of how markets functioned was also reflected with the journal 
publishing an increasing number of articles written by 
economists on the relationship between output and demand.
The initial BTS contribution from the economists in reply 
to the concerns raised by Person came from Irving Fisher who 
in 1924 leapt to the defence of Say's law. Fisher insisted there 
was no real problem as far as demand was concerned for the 
market would ensure that as output increased so did real 
wages.
Even if it were possible for employers at first to "hog" all the 
savings accruing from scientific management and refuse to give 
any bonus to labor, in the end the advantages would percolate 
through-out society just as today we all get the advantage of the 
telephone despite the enormous returns to the few original 
investors. In the end labor gains the most from so-called "labor 
saving devices." Increased production means simply increased 
income to society, and the wage earner as a class usually profits 
most in the end. Scientific management by which the bricklayer 
doubles or quadruples the number of bricks laid, reduces the rent 
of brick houses. Scientific management which makes more shoes 
and clothes decreases the real cost of shoes and clothes to all. 
Real wages consist of shoes and clothes and shelter and food and 
the other things which labor consumes. Any device which 
facilitates their production tends to increase real wages (Fisher 
1924, 241).
Fisher concluded his contribution by advising employers 
and employees to focus ever more closely on increasing 
output and leave the issue of distribution to the market. His 
faith in market forces, however, does not appear to have 
satisfied the apprehension of all those who were concerned 
with the relationship between output, consumption and 
economic stabilisation. In December 1925 Paul Douglas 
presented a paper at the American Economic Association 
Conference titled 'The Movement of Real Wages and its 
Economic Significance'. In this paper Douglas traced the 
change in wages that had occurred in the United States 
through the period 1895 -1924. He reported that in 1924 wage- 
eamers in manufacturing and transportation could purchase 
27 per cent more goods and services than in 1890 with 
virtually all of this improvement having occurred since 1914. 
He acknowledged that worker productivity through the post- 
1914 period of accelerated productivity growth had increased
at a faster rate than the real increase in wages. However, he 
suggested that most of the discrepancy could be explained by 
the significant increase that had occurred in the proportion of 
the workforce employed as salaried staff (Douglas 1925).
Douglas's conclusion that employees were in fact receiving 
an almost proportional share of the rewards of the increasing 
productivity of American industry was accepted by the 
discussants at the economists' conference. This included 
George Soule, an individual who subsequently became a 
com m itted participant in the scientific m anagem ent 
movement and a critic of those who had failed to give 
sufficient consideration to the problem of effective demand. 
However, more interesting for our purposes was the 
contribution of the industrialist Magnus W. Alexander. The 
latter observed that he was not an economist but an engineer 
who was interested in the extent to which economic theory 
could reveal facts and furnish guiding principles to practising 
industrial managers. Reflecting the Taylorist's concern with 
the issue of distribution he observed that what managers 
especially needed from the economists was a formula that 
would provide a basis for equitably dividing the wealth 
produced by industry's utilisation of scientific management 
amongst society's many competing interests. He was insistent 
that this formula must be both capable of dealing with 
dynamic situations and of being adapted to the specifics of 
differing industries and enterprises. This was because:
Efficiency, first of all, is a problem of individuals and cases, in 
relation to particular processes or separate productive 
organizations. Scientific management, which is the fundamental 
basis of efficiency, is concerned only with the organization of 
men, materials, and machines, for the most effective manufacture 
of particular products in particular plants under particular
conditions. Therefore, organizations and formulas embracing 
diverse groups, different establishments, diverse processes, 
however pertinent they may be to other purposes, are necessarily 
irrelevant or extraneous to the requirements of scientific 
management (Alexander 1926,67).
Alexander was not alone at the 1925 conference in 
observing that industry was in dire need of an effective 
theoretical instrum ent for allocating the "fru its  of 
production". This claim was also voiced by John Frey of the 
American Federation of Labor. At a round table session on, 
T h e Consuming Power of Labor and Business Fluctuations' 
Frey disputed the claim that workers were being paid a wage 
commensurate with their increasing productivity. While 
lauding the contribution of the engineers to the management 
of resources he noted that "perfect management" of an 
enterprise was of little value if the firm was simply not 
operating. He therefore urged the economists to find some 
means to enhance the purchasing power of the worker. 
Where Person, with whom the AFL was by this time closely 
collaborating, had accepted that American managers would 
find a way to deal with the demand problem, Frey was much 
more alarmist.
The greatest problem facing modern industry is the fact that it 
has failed to establish a market which could purchase its 
products. Unless wages increase in proportion to the increasing 
power of industry to produce, depressions in business must become 
increasingly frequent and severe. Cycles of business will 
undoubtedly continue, but the extent and duration of depressions 
will be influenced very largely by the purchasing power of wages 
which are being paid (Frey 1926, 83).
Alexander and Frey's request for a formula for equitably
dividing the rewards of increased productivity produced fruit 
in the form of the Cobb-Douglas function. Cobb and Douglas 
presented the results of their collaboration at the 1927 
conference of the American Economics Association in a 
session titled 'Economic and Social Aspects of Increased 
Productive Efficiency'. As a consequence of a request from the 
Economics Association, Woodlief Thomas of the Federal 
Reserve Board also presented a paper at this session. The 
latter's paper, 'The Economic Significance of the Increased 
Efficiency of American Industry', observed that in the sixteen 
years 1899 to 1914 productivity growth in manufacturing had 
expanded by less than 0.5 per cent. In the eight years 1919 to 
1926 conversely output per worker increased by almost 40%. 
Nor was this expansion confined to manufacturing for 
comparable rates of growth were experienced in mining, 
transportation and agriculture (Thomas 1928; Durand 1930).
A rate of productivity growth of this magnitude, Douglas 
(1927, 20) noted elsewhere, was "probably unparalleled in the 
history of the world". This perspective was endorsed by Ewan 
Clague who in a series of articles in the M onthly Labor 
Review  reported on the extent of the transformation within 
US industry. Clauge (1926,1) argued that the United States was 
experiencing what was "perhaps the most remarkable advance 
in productive efficiency in the history of the modern 
industrial system" and that the nature and extent of this 
advance was such that it had to be considered nothing less 
than a "second industrial revolution". What had caused this 
phenomena, Clauge advised, was difficult to specify. He 
identified what he thought were the more significant 
influences amongst which he included the rationalising 
activities of the scientific management movement. However, 
he failed to accord any weighting to these influences and 
hence his contribution was more a sketch than an exercise in
explanatory analysis.
Others proved less reluctant when asked to explain the 
extremely high rates of productivity growth that characterised 
American industry in the 1920s. Through the rest of the 
decade foreign observers flocked to the United State seeking to 
find the secret of America's enhanced ability to produce. The 
opinions of these individuals was summarised by Edwin Gay 
in the 1929 volume Recent Economic Changes. This book was 
the product of a study commissioned by Hoover which sought 
to specify the character and source of the post-war productivity 
eruption. In his summation Gay noted that while foreign 
observers emphasised the importance of America's natural 
resources, labour saving machinery and vast market when 
explaining US prosperity, they invariably concluded that an 
important factor inducing the post-war acceleration in the rate 
of growth was the widespread adoption of scientific 
management practices. Indeed, many concluded that this was 
the key explanatory factor.
The problem of correlating abundant resources, expensive labor, 
and unsurpassed machine equipment, to serve the greatest of 
markets, has put a high premium on management and organizing 
capacity. Scientific management in industry and commerce, 
apparently the resultant of emerging pressures, is thought by 
many of the foreigners writing on recent economic changes in the 
United States to be the chief contribution which this country is 
making to economic welfare and to be the key to its success (Gay
1929, 5).
Hunt (1929, 35-39) reported in the BTS that the American 
contributors to Recent Economic Changes generally endorsed 
the perspective of these foreign observers. It was accepted that 
the application of scientific management practices into ever 
new areas of the economy had given a tremendous boost to
the pre-existing forces inducing productivity growth within 
the economy. Hunt advised that Wesley M itchell had 
captured accurately the conclusions of the contributors in a 
"single striking sentence" when the latter observed: "Since
1921, Americans have applied intelligence to the day's work 
more effectively than ever before". While a little more 
verbose, the spirit and essence of the report was possibly best 
captured by Stanley H. Jevons in The Economic Journal in 
1931. Appreciating the implications of what was happening in 
America Jevons observed:
The Advanced industrial countries of the world are now in the 
first stage of a sweeping change of the methods and organisation 
of all their secondary industries, and .... this new movement is 
likely to be comparable in its industrial, commercial and social 
effects with that series of changes which commenced in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century and is commonly called the 
Industrial Revolution. The changes are coming about as the result 
not merely of the application of scientific knowledge to industry, 
which was, in fact, the last phase of the first industrial 
revolution, but of the use of the inductive method in the study of 
an industry, and individual concerns composing it, with a view of 
gaining facts and generalisations which may serve sooner or later 
as the basis of the replanning of the productive process and 
plant. The essence of the new industrial revolution is the search 
for exact knowledge, and the planning of processes: from the 
minutiae of manual operations (based on motion study) to the 
lay-out of the machinery of a gigantic plant—even of a whole 
industry throughout the country (Jevons 1931,1).
Jevons accepted that the 'second industrial revolution' had 
been a long time in coming and that the American scientific 
managers were not the only contributors to its development. 
However, he made it clear that he also accepted that the "date
1911, when Taylor published his famous Principles o f  
Scientific Management, inaugurates a definite acceleration of 
the second industrial revolution" (Jevons 1931: 2).
The members of the Taylor Society were themselves more 
circum spect in utilising the term 'Second Industrial 
Revolution' but accepted that the significance of what was 
occurring in the United States justified its use. Shortly after 
the publication of Recent Economic Changes and at the 
instigation of Edward Filene of the Taylor Society, the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science held a 
conference under the rubric of 'The Second Industrial 
Revolution and its Significance'. The subsequent volume of 
the Academy's A nnals  was edited by Percy S. Brown, a past 
president of the Taylor Society. In his opening address Henry 
Dennison (1930, 1-2) observed that he had sympathy with the 
"more careful social scientists" who were troubled by the term 
'Second Industrial Revolution' but justified its utilisation as 
accurately capturing the speed of the recent economic changes 
that had occurred within the United States. He also justified 
the utilisation of the term on the pragmatic grounds that it 
was critical that analysts appreciate the urgency of the need to 
give consideration to the probable consequences of the 
transformation that was occurring.
The concern Dennison clearly felt was also expressed by 
H.S. Person. In his paper to the conference Person attempted 
to highlight the fact that the Committee on Recent Economic 
Changes had concluded that the outstanding problem of the 
day confronting industry was the need to find some means for 
attaining economic balance. Noting that both classical and 
Marxist economics assumed demand always pressed upon 
supply he insisted that what was happening in America had 
negated this assumption.
Within two decades .... the very productivity of scientific 
management and of mechanization has transformed the 
assumption in economic conduct to that of a surplus economy. 
While it may be that this concept of a surplus economy cannot be 
permanent, it is now, and apparently for a long time will be, the 
dominant influence in our economic conduct (Person 1930,91).
It was therefore critical that appropriate demand-centred 
policies be developed that could deal with this new situation. 
What America required urgently, Person and Dennison had 
come to believe, were new techniques for managing the 
economy at the macro level. Further, they believed that it was 
necessary to accept that in some instances these techniques 
would have to involve "direct and indirect social control of 
the individual enterpriser through measures analogous to 
traffic lights" (Person 1930, 90). In short, they believed the 
problems generated by the emergence of a surplus society 
simply could not be left to resolve themselves and moreover 
their resolution could not be left in hands of an unregulated 
market.
[W]e must manage ourselves if we are to gain on the past. No 
laissez faire, no unchanneled and unimpeded course of nature, no 
invisible hand will do it for us. Unless there is growing social 
control to meet the unquestioned growing social complexity, most 
of us must believe, I think, that we can expect no happier fate for 
mankind; and many of us would risk the prediction of 
retrogression to ultimate catastrophe (Dennison 1930,1-2).
DEMAND MANAGEMENT AND DEPRESSION
The perspective advanced by Dennison and Person in 1930 
was far and away from the enterprise centred focus they had
advocated in the early years of the 1920s. An understanding of 
how this transformation came about can be attained by 
examining the debates that occurred within the Taylor Society 
in the later years of the decade. Perusing the BTS it is clear that 
from late 1927 at least some of the leaders of scientific 
management movement were becoming concerned that their 
stabilisation policies were not having the degree of success 
that had been envisaged. In December 1927 the industrialist 
Wilfred Lewis delivered a paper to the Taylor Society in 
which he lauded the achievements of the scientific 
m anagement movement. Lewis claimed the four key 
objectives of the movement had become the reduction of 
costs, the raising of wages, the encouragement of collaboration 
between employers and employees and the full employment 
of workers and machinery. The extent to which these 
objectives were being attained, he concluded, enabled the 
people of "America to look forward hopefully to the future" 
(Lewis 1927, 557).
The response to Lewis' paper indicated that not all 
members of the Taylor Society shared his optimism. While he 
was praised by some commentators, his suggestion that there 
was wide acceptance amongst employers of the positive value 
of high wages was challenged. It was also observed that his 
belief the good times were "practically certain to continue .... is 
an assumption which may well be questioned" (Muste 1928, 
47). The concern within the Society was also manifested at the 
December 1927 convention by the presentation of two papers 
dealing with macroeconomic demand management and 
wages respectively. Person's decision to accept these latter 
papers for presentation and subsequent publication was a 
consequence of his concern at the fact that unemployment 
had risen sharply in mid 1927 and his belief that the enterprise 
focused strategy for attaining stabilisation had not realised its
desired goals. He noted in an editorial in the BTS  that the 
enterprise focus had not even been able to achieve a situation 
where it was possible to be certain as to what was likely to 
confront the firm in the near future. This failure he suggested, 
raised the "large question" of whether the focus of the 
scientific manager had to be expanded beyond the level of the 
enterprise.
Can the planning which has proved to be effective in co­
ordinating the departments of the individual enterprise be 
established on a plane on which enterprises are but departments 
of one integral social enterprise? Is it possible to formulate a 
social budget through which government operations are so 
administered as to effect regulation of the total of individual 
enterprises (Person 1928,1)?
The Taylorists' concern with this much wider notion of 
management was also a manifestation of their growing 
interest in the European rationalisation movement (Person 
1927, 391-393). Of this latter movement Person observed 
subsequently that while the rationalisers had focused initially 
on the macro economy they had come to embrace issues that 
had traditionally concerned the scientific management 
movement. At the same time the scientific managers had 
been concomitantly expanding their notions of what were the 
limits of scientific management.
Starting from opposite poles scientific management and 
rationalization are apparently moving each toward the other. 
With a background of experience with state socialism, the latter 
thought first in terms of socially controlled reorganization of all 
industry and then of scientific management of the particular 
situation. Scientific management, on the other hand, with its 
background of extreme individualism, started with the problem
of the individual plant, then proceeded to application of its 
principles and technique to the management of groups of plants 
under one ownership. Socially it has developed the concept of 
voluntary trade standardization. Ultimately, although 
probably still with individualistic bias, it may in America come 
to be applied to the organization and control of entire industries 
and all industry (Person 1929, 15-16).
The paper on demand management presented at the 
December 1927 convention was by H.B. Brougham of the 
Poliak foundation for Economic Research. Brougham's paper, 
'Must Prosperity Be Planned?', examined the question of 
whether effective demand could be adapted, controlled and 
graduated in line with the increased capacity of industry. He 
began by criticising Hoover's waste study observing that the 
latter had advised that the stabilisation of production required 
that productive capacity be based upon the careful study of 
existing demand. This advice, he asserted, was the perspective 
of the individual who sought merely to plan for the 
enterprise. One who wished to plan for the nation, 
conversely, must adopt a very different approach seeking not 
to stabilise production but to constantly expand output and to 
facilitate this process by ensuring that there was adequate 
purchasing power in the market. In short: "Normal demand 
should be based on a careful study of productive capacity, and 
should be steadily increased as capacity to produce increases" 
(Brougham 1928, 2).
Brougham observed that if the general purchasing power 
of consumers could not be increased in line with the increased 
productive capacity of the nation it would be impossible to 
avoid periodic economic recessions. Drawing upon Douglas's 
paper on the movement of real wages he asserted that the fact 
that the incomes of workers had increased dramatically since 
1921 was a critical factor contributing to the economic
prosperity the nation was experiencing. He observed, 
however, the number of wage earners enjoying this new 
found prosperity was a matter of concern. The Census of 
Manufactures had shown that between 1919 and 1925, a period 
during which the population had grown by 12 per cent, the 
number of wage earners in manufacturing had decreased by 
seven per cent. Brougham refused to embrace Douglas' easy 
dismissal of the declining number of wage workers and urged 
the members of the Taylor Society to give consideration to the 
effect of this phenomena on effective demand. He conceded 
that thus far there had not occurred a crisis of overproduction 
but suggested that this was primarily because of the vast 
increase in bank credit created by the "easy money" policies 
that had been followed by the Federal Reserve Board since
1922. Aware that it was not possible for the banks to 
continuously expand credit Brougham suggested the answer 
lay in the creation, at a federal level, of a department of 
management engineering whose purpose would be to manage 
the economy. It would do so by expanding investments in 
"non-productive assets" such as public buildings and parks 
when there was excessive capacity within industry and would 
pay for this investment by increasing taxes at those times 
when there was excessive demand.
The second paper at the December 1927 convention 
expressing concern with developments in the economy was 
presented by the industrialist Henry Williams. The key point 
made by Williams was that while managers tended to support 
the notion that the payment of high wages was to be 
applauded, with few exceptions they remained as obdurate as 
ever in their opposition to high wages within their own 
enterprises. He called therefore for the Taylor Society to give 
serious consideration to how the conflict between the 
immediate interests of managers and the interests of industry
and indeed society as a whole might be overcome.
In the discussion that followed the presentation of the 
papers by Brougham and Williams there were differences as 
regards the best means of dealing with the demand problem 
with some unconvinced there was any serious need for 
concern. M oreover, amongst those who were clearly 
perturbed there were differences as to the respective role that 
should be accorded the individual firm and the state. Indeed, 
there was even disagreement amongst those who accepted the 
need for the macroeconomic planning of demand. Thus 
Rexford Tugwell (1928, 19) criticised the notion that the 
planning of demand could be undertaken effectively within a 
capitalist economy observing that planning "in a larger sense, 
is, in a free system of enterprise, very nearly an anomaly."
These differences continued to be reflected in the BTS in 
the period through to the end of 1929 with the perspective of 
the optimists tending to predominate. Indeed, even after the 
"unpleasantness associated with the quotation factory at the 
com er of Broad and Wall Streets", as the statistician R.W. 
Burgess described the stock market crash, many Society 
members appear to have remained optimistic as regards the 
future. Asked to analyse the results of Hoover's R ecen t  
Econom ic Changes study Burgess concluded that the 
"economic forces at work in the United States are in the main 
well balanced resulting in a very satisfactory background for 
vigorous enterprise" (Burgess 1929, 239).
The divergent response to his paper, however, made clear 
the growing divisions within the Society. George Soule was 
especially critical of the emphasis Burgess placed on the 
voluntary involvement of employers in the implementation 
of stabilisation strategies. He also criticised the fact that 
H oover's report had suggested employers were widely 
embracing the wisdom of the economy of high wages. Soule
observed that the available data showed this simply not the 
case and insisted that there was a growing disparity between 
the nation's capacity to produce and its ability to consume 
brought on by the fact that productivity growth was 
outstripping the growth of wages. Whereas in 1925 he had 
accepted Douglas's claim that workers' incomes were keeping 
up with productivity growth he now observed that "the 
increase in wage earnings has nowhere paralleled the increase 
in the productivity of industry" (Soule 1929, 250). The 
voluntary approach to demand management was a failure, he 
concluded, and it was imperative that some alternative way be 
found to ensure the real income of workers was increased in 
line with industry's increasing productivity.
We cannot keep up production unless consumption is adequately 
increased to absorb that production, and consumption cannot be 
increased unless the wage earners, who form such a large part of 
the public, have increased purchasing power .... But the increase 
in wage earnings has nowhere paralleled the increase in the 
productivity of industry (Soule 1929, 249-250).
Soule in turn was criticised for his contribution by those 
monetarists at the convention who were associated with 
Irving Fisher. The latter were particularly incensed at his 
suggestion that the trade unions and the anti-trust laws 
should be strengthened in order to ensure the rewards of the 
enhanced productivity growth were not hoarded by a small 
minority of the population (Meeker 1929, 251) His concern, 
however, appears to have been shared by others as is indicated 
by the fact that the Program Committee of the Taylor Society 
had invited Wesley C. Mitchell, the Director of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, to present a paper to the 
Decem ber 1929 convention on the issue of market 
stabilisation. More specifically, Mitchell was asked by the
Society to answer the question "Are there practicable steps 
toward an industrial equilibrium?" In his reply Mitchell 
noted that the Committee which had sponsored Recent 
Economic Changes was convinced the prosperity of American 
industry could be sustained only if a balance between the 
economic forces within the economy was maintained. The 
Committee was also convinced that this would occur only if it 
was possible to "develop a technique of balance" (Mitchell
1930, 4). Mitchell noted economic theory generally accepted 
that capitalist economies tend to gravitate in the direction of 
equilibrium even if they never attain this state. The "theorist" 
therefore believed there was no need to develop a new 
technique of balance because it already existed as an inherent 
part of the market system. However, said theorist also 
acknowledged that "real life commercial demand and supply" 
were not based on adequate knowledge and that in this area 
there was "plenty of room for improvement" (Mitchell 1930, 
4). One "subtle problem" that especially needed to be 
confronted in this regard was how to disseminate the 
knowledge required to ensure there was adequate demand 
within the economy. He noted approvingly that at that very 
moment in Washington, Hoover was gathering together the 
major economic interests of the nation in order to undertake, 
on a national scale, a step of "great technical interest". This 
was the President's attempt to induce the major industrialists 
to agree to maintain wages and prices in order to avoid the 
collapse into depression. Mitchell called upon the managers of 
the Taylor Society to not only support this national effort but 
to strive to take further steps within industry that would 
contribute towards industrial equilibrium.
M itchell's observation that the Taylor Society should 
support H oover's efforts in W ashington was given 
overwhelming endorsement. The Society passed a formal
motion that both supported Hoover and called for an even 
greater role for the state in the management of the economy 
(Taylor Society 1929, 253). Indeed, the more interventionist 
participants at the convention went further than Mitchell 
probably intended. Stuart Chase (1930, 9), who in 1926 had 
published a book The Tragedy of Waste which lauded the 
contribution of the scientific management to the heightening 
of industrial efficiency, for example, urged Society members 
both to study the experiments being conducted by the Soviet 
economic planners and to support the establishment of an 
"economic general staff" which would advise on economic 
policy both at the national and regional level.
The need for a more interventionist and regulatory state 
was also argued by Leonard Kuvin of the Index Number 
Institute who insisted that the most important element in 
what he saw was a looming economic crisis was the "impeded 
growth in the standard of living". Strategies to deal with the 
"chronic condition" into which the economy was collapsing, 
he observed, "must deal effectively with the inability of 
consumers to acquire for use the goods which they are so 
instrumental in producing" (Kuvin 1930, 13). In support of his 
claim that there was a "disharmony between the forces of 
production and the forces of consumption", Kuvin provided 
data from the Bureau of the Census that revealed the extent to 
which the productive capacity of US industry was 
underutilised. He also provided evidence that wage earners 
were receiving a decreasing proportion of the nation's output 
and suggested this development was especially worrying 
because employers were utilising the funds that should have 
been paid to labour to further expand their capacity to 
produce.
The consequence of these development was a "vicious 
circle of excess capacity and limited demand" a situation
which, he insisted, had reached a stage where it could not be 
penetrated in a simple fashion. He observed that at the 
present time two methods were being put into operation 
under the leadership of Hoover. One was psychological 
involving the inducement of confidence amongst the nation's 
industrialists and the other was the reduction in taxes and the 
increase in funds for public works. What was really required, 
however, was some means of increasing wages and reducing 
the prices of commodities and it was America's lack of any 
such devise that was the key element inducing the existing 
crisis. Consequently, America must develop on a national 
scale an effective method of credit regulation and control 
which would systematically expand credit to those industries 
underequiped and curb temporarily the availability of credit to 
those that were overequiped. If this could be achieved, Kuvin 
concluded, the "chronic disproportion between productive 
and consum ptive capacities" would be overcome and 
America "be one step nearer the practical achievement of a 
program of industrial equilibrium" (Kuvin 1930, 15).
Hoover's valiant attempt to halt the oncoming depression 
by coordinating the price and wage policies of the major 
industrialists and by limited deficit spending has been well 
documented by Barber (1985). The President sadly, proved 
incapable of breaking with the stabilisation policies he had 
helped to develop through the early and middle years of the 
1920s even when the growing magnitude of the crisis made 
clear the inadequacy of these policies. As a consequence of 
Hoover's refusal to embrace a more radical, statist program 
the leaders of the Taylor Society turned to the Democratic 
Party and to Roosevelt. Indeed, many Taylorists played a 
major role in the development and implementation of the 
policies associated of the Roosevelt Administration. These 
included Justice Louis Brandeis—the individual who coined
the term scientific management; Stuart Chase who did the 
same for the New Deal; Rexford Tugwell who became one of 
the most influential members of Roosevelt's Brains Trust; 
Henry Dennison and Lincoln Filene who largely constituted 
the liberal wing of the Administration's Business Advisory 
Council and Morris Cooke, a man whom Soule (1967, 128) 
reports was the primary architect of the "most successful and 
the most celebrated of all the projects undertaken under the 
New Deal"—the Tennessee Valley Authority.
In his analysis of Hoover and his policies, Barber cites 
Tugwell to the effect that the New Dealers owed much to 
Hoover especially as regards his enlargem ent of the 
knowledge available to those who would seek to extend the 
visible hand. He notes that Tugwell readily acknowledged that 
the brains trust got much of its material from the Hoover 
Committees or from the work done under their auspices. 
Barber (1985, 194) concludes his book by quoting Tugwell's 
observation that: "The Hundred Days was the breaking of a 
dam rather than the conjuring out of nowhere of a river". It is 
most appropriate to bring this paper towards a conclusion by 
citing Tugwell shortly before the dam burst as to what he 
believed had fed this river. In 1932, in an address to the 
American Economics Association Tugwell observed:
If we have been watching, describing, analysing industry as we 
should, we must have known that the greatest economic event of 
the nineteenth century occurred when Frederick W. Taylor first 
held a stop watch on the movements of a group of shovelers in 
the plant of the Midvale Steel Company .... The forces which 
were to make the future went unnoticed. The world is paying now 
for this dogmatic dream of the economists .... If we had had eyes 
to see the implications of Taylor's work we should have known 
that the vast expansion of production which must follow would
clog all the old channels of trade, swamp the mechanisms of an 
artificially limited commerce, and end in a period of violent 
reconstruction. Some of the sufferings of the present might 
possibly have been avoided. We failed to understand because our 
eyes were blind to the technology which was revolutionizing the 
materials of our science (Tugwell 1932: 87).
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to add to the literature produced by the 
revisionist historians who have challenged the notion that 
scientific management was primarily an anti-worker labour 
control strategy. By utilising a largely unexplored primary 
source, The Bulletin o f the Taylor Society, it has been possible 
to sketch the manner by which the stabilisation policies of the 
scientific managers matured in the years through to 1930. In 
the BTS  there is a clear evolutionary expansion in the 
thinking of the Taylorists. Beginning by concentrating on the 
development of stabilisation practices at the workshop level 
they came to focus in time on the whole firm and finally 
became convinced that an effective stabilisation program 
must embrace all levels of the economic environment.
We believe that by revealing the extent and nature of the 
Taylorists' involvement with the issue of market stabilisation 
we have been able to uncover another dimension of their 
work. We have also furthered explanation of why the labour 
movement in the United States came to collaborate with the 
scientific management movement in the interwar years. This 
is an all but impossible phenomena to explain if one remains 
confined within the narrow Braverman/labour-process view 
of scientific management. However, it is possible to 
understand if a broader evaluation of this movement is 
accepted. With this broader perspective it is not difficult to
perceive how it could be that while organised labour might 
remain suspicious and even hostile towards some of the 
practices of the Taylorists they would be attracted to analysts 
who sought to develop programs that provided workers not 
only with higher wages and reduced working hours but also 
with greater job security.
In her 1989 reevaluation of the work of the scientific 
managers in the area of public administration, Schachter 
urged the need for analysts who seek to understand the 
scientific management movement to cease relying solely on 
text books and secondary literature. Sadly, this is advice which 
analysts in the areas of industrial relations and labour history 
appear extremely reluctant to heed. In the literature which 
seeks to appraise the nature of the movement it is common to 
come across articles, books and even Ph.D.s in which authors 
fail to cite the movement's main journal and base their 
explanations of the nature of scientific management on 
secondary literature with perhaps a partial reading of Taylor 
thrown in for good measure. The ignoring of such primary 
data as the Taylor Society's journal, we suggest, is not only 
poor scholarship it is also unjust. The scientific managers 
deserve better treatment.
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